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Abstract
We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A
(social choice) rule assigns an act to every prole of subjective expected utility preferences
over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs
about the world or her valuation of the outcomes; it is ex-post e¢ cient if the act selected
at any given preference prole picks a Pareto-e¢ cient outcome in every state of the world.
We show that every two-agent ex-post e¢ cient and strategy-proof rule is a top selection: the
chosen act picks the most preferred outcome of some (possibly di¤erent) agent in every state
of the world. The states in which an agents top outcome is selected cannot vary with the
reported valuations of the outcomes but may change with the reported beliefs. We give a
complete characterization of the ex-post e¢ cient and strategy-proof rules in the two-agent,
two-state case, and we identify a rich class of such rules in the two-agent case.
JEL Classication: D71.
Keywords: Social choice under uncertainty, strategy-proofness, subjective expected utility.
1 Introduction
We address the problem of designing incentive-compatible rules for making social choices under
uncertainty. Following Savage (1954), we model such choices as acts mapping states of the world
to outcomes, and we assume that agents compare acts according to the subjective expected utility
they yield. Society chooses acts on the basis of the preferences of its members: a social choice
rule asks agents to report full-edged preferences over acts, and assigns an act to every pref-
erence prole. If individual preferences are private information, it is important that a rule be
incentive-compatible. This paper focuses on the condition of strategy-proofness, which requires
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ted from comments by H. Moulin. Many thanks to all of them. The research reported in this
paper was supported by a FRQSC grant.
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that reporting ones true preferences be a dominant strategy: no agent should ever have an in-
centive to misrepresent her beliefs about the world or her valuation of the outcomes. Because
subjective expected utility preferences form a restricted domain, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theo-
rem (Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975)) does not apply. This raises the problem of describing
the set of strategy-proof social choice rules.
To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been studied. The related literature
may be divided into three strands. The rst strand is concerned with the problem of eliciting
an agents assessment of the likelihood of events in which she has no stake. The best known
incentive-compatible elicitation procedures are Savages (1971) proper scoring rules; see Gneiting
and Raftery (2007) for a survey of the literature on the topic. Other procedures include de Finettis
(1974) promissory notes method and Karnis (2009) direct revelation mechanism. These methods
do not elicit the agents valuation of the outcomes and do not address the problem of choosing a
social act based on individual preferences.
The second relevant strand studies strategy-proofness in the context of risk, that is, when
society chooses lotteries rather than acts. The seminal contribution is due to Gibbard (1977),
who analyzes social choice rules asking agents to report their preferences over sure outcomes
only. Hylland (1980), Dutta, Peters and Sen (2007, 2008), and Nandeibam (2013) allow agents to
report full-edged von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries. A central nding in this
literature is that every strategy-proof and ex-post e¢ cient rule is a random dictatorship. Ex-post
e¢ ciency requires that the chosen lottery attaches zero probability to every Pareto-dominated sure
outcome. A random dictatorship selects each agents most preferred outcome with a probability
that does not depend on the reported preference prole.
Finally, let us mention that the issue of preference aggregation under uncertainty has received
a good deal of attention: see Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), Mongin (1995), Gilboa, Samet and
Schmeidler (2004), and Gilboa, Samuelson and Schmeidler (2014), among others. This literature,
which is normative in nature, is not concerned with the incentive-compatibility issue and is there-
fore only tangentially related to our work. It shows that utilitarian aggregation of preferences is
problematic; it also questions the desirability of Pareto e¢ ciency when individual beliefs di¤er,
and proposes weakened versions of it.
In line with the literature on strategy-proofness under risk, we restrict attention to social choice
rules that are ex-post e¢ cient. Under uncertainty, ex-post e¢ ciency means that the act selected
at a given preference prole should recommend a Pareto-e¢ cient outcome in every state of the
world. The requirement does not imply (ex-ante) Pareto e¢ ciency.
Our results are restricted to the two-agent case. Proposition 1 establishes that every two-agent
strategy-proof and ex-post e¢ cient social choice rule must be a top selection: at every preference
prole, the chosen act must pick the most preferred outcome of some (possibly di¤erent) agent
in every state of the world. The analog of random dictatorship consists in exogenously assigning
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each state to an agent and picking each agents top outcome in the states assigned to her. A top
selection need not be a random dictatorship because the states in which an agents top outcome
is selected may vary with the reported preference prole.
Proposition 2 states that, in order to guarantee strategy-proofness, the states in which an
agents top outcome is selected cannot vary with the reported valuations of the outcomes.
On the other hand, it turns out that the beliefs of the agents can be used to assign states
to agents: the mechanism designer can exploit the di¤erences in subjective probabilities so as to
have each agent select the outcome in states that she nds relatively more likely. This can be
done in at least two ways. A dictatorial assignment rule lets one agent select from an exogenous
menu the event that she considers most likely; the social choice rule then picks that agents top
outcome in every state in that event, and the other agents top outcome in the remaining states.
Under a consensual assignment rule, two non-nested events are exogenously selected. The rst
is tentatively assigned to agent 1 and its complement is assigned to agent 2: However, if agent 1
reports that the second event is more likely than the rst and agent 2 reports the opposite belief,
they exchange events. The social choice rule picks an agents reported top outcome in every state
in the event that the consensual assignment rule has assigned to her. Proposition 3 states that,
when there are only two possible states of the world, a two-agent social choice rule is strategy-proof
and ex-post e¢ cient if and only if it is a top selection generated by a dictatorial or consensual
assignment rule.
When the state space contains more than two states, Proposition 4 shows how the basic rules
just described can be combined to generate a rich family of fairly exible and reasonably symmetric
two-agent strategy-proof and ex-post e¢ cient social choice rules.
A last and technical introductory remark is in order. The set of acts is a Cartesian product, and
subjective expected utility preferences over acts are additively separable. It is known that when
individual preferences over a product set of social alternatives are separable and form a suitably
rich domain, strategy-proof social choice rules are products of strategy-proof sub-rulesdened
on the marginal proles of preferences over the components of the social alternatives. Le Breton
and Sen (1999) o¤er general theorems of this type; earlier papers proving variants of the result
include Border and Jordan (1983), Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991), and Barberà, Gul and
Stacchetti (1993). This decomposition property does not hold in our setting. The reason is that
subjective expected utility preferences do not form a rich domain. Le Breton and Sens (1999)
richness condition requires that for any collection of admissible preferences over the components of
the social alternatives there exists a preference over the social alternatives which induces marginal
preferences over components coinciding with the ones in that collection. Since in our setting all
the state-contingent preferences over outcomes induced by a subjective expected utility preference
over acts are the same, Le Breton and Sens condition is violated. It is this lack of richness that
allows one to dene non-decomposable rules where beliefs a¤ect the states where each agents top
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outcome is selected.
2 Denitions
There is a nite set of agents N = f1; :::; ng with n  2; a nite set of states of the world

 = f!1; :::; !Kg with K  2; and a nite set of outcomes X = fx1; :::; xMg with M  3: Subsets
of 
 are called events. The set of acts is F := X
. Agent is preference ordering <i over acts is
assumed to be of the subjective expected utility type: there exist a valuation function vi : X ! R
and a subjective probability measure pi on the set of events such that for all f; f 0 2 F ,
f %i f 0 ,
X
!2

pi(!)vi(f(!)) 
X
!2

pi(!)vi(f
0(!));
where we write ! instead of f!g to alleviate notation. Of course, since the set of acts is nite, nei-
ther the valuation function vi nor the subjective probability measure pi representing the preference
ordering <i are determined uniquely.
Throughout the paper, we assume that <i is a linear ordering. Since the set of acts is nite,
this is not an outrageous assumption. It implies that for any (pi; vi) representing <i, (i) vi is
injective and (ii) pi is injective: for all E;E 0  
, pi(E) = pi(E 0) ) E = E 0: Because pi(?) = 0,
it follows from (ii) that pi(!) > 0 for all ! 2 
: We further assume, without loss of generality,
that vi is normalized: minX vi = 0 < maxX vi = 1:We denote by V the set of normalized injective
valuation functions vi and by P the set of (necessarily positive) injective measures pi.
A (social choice) rule is a function ' : VN  PN ! F : If (v; p) 2 VN  PN and ! 2 
, we
denote by '(v; p;!) the outcome chosen by the act '(v; p) in state !. We call v = (v1; :::; vn) 2 VN
a valuation prole and p = (p1; :::; pn) 2 PN a belief prole. A rule assigns an act to each
prole of valuations and beliefs. We emphasize that the chosen act is allowed to change when an
agents valuation function is replaced with another that induces the same ranking of the outcomes:
no information about individual preferences over acts is a priori discarded. Note also that, in
principle, our formulation allows a rule ' to choose di¤erent acts for proles of valuations and
beliefs (v; p) and (v0; p0) that represent the same prole of preferences (<1; :::;<n). Of course,
the requirement of strategy-proofness dened below will rule this out: in e¤ect, a strategy-proof
rule assigns an act to every prole of subjective expected utility preferences (<1; :::;<n) over acts.
With a slight abuse of terminology, we therefore call any (v; p) 2 VN  PN a preference prole.
We denote the set of social choice rules by (N).
As usual, v i 2 VNnfig and p i 2 PNnfig denote the valuation and belief sub-proles obtained
by deleting vi from v and pi from p, respectively. A rule ' is strategy-proof if, for all i 2 N; all
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(vi; pi); (v
0
i; p
0
i) 2 V  P ; and all (v i; p i) 2 VNnfig  PNnfig;X
!2

pi(!)vi('(v; p;!)) 
X
!2

pi(!)vi('((v
0
i; v i); (p
0
i; p i);!)):
This means that distorting ones preferences by misrepresenting ones valuation function or ones
beliefs is never protable. A weaker condition rules out misrepresentations of ones valuation
function: ' is misvaluation-proof if, for all i 2 N; all vi; v0i 2 V ; all v i 2 VNnfig; and all p 2 PN ;
X
!2

pi(!)vi('(v; p;!)) 
X
!2

pi(!)vi('((v
0
i; v i); p;!)):
A rule ' is ex-post e¢ cient if for all (v; p) 2 VN PN and all ! 2 
, there is no x 2 X such that
vi(x) > vi('(v; p;!)) for all i 2 N: This requirement does not imply that the acts chosen by ' are
(ex-ante Pareto) e¢ cient at all preference proles.
3 Results
Throughout this section we assume that N = f1; 2g : For any vi 2 V ; let (vi) denote the unique
maximizer (or top) of vi in X. A rule ' 2 (f1; 2g) is a top selection if '(v; p;!) 2 f(v1); (v2)g
for all (v; p) 2 Vf1;2g  Pf1;2g and all ! 2 
:
Proposition 1. If a social choice rule ' 2 (f1; 2g) is misvaluation-proof and ex-post e¢ cient,
then ' is a top selection.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 says that misvaluation-proofness and ex-post e¢ ciency forbid choosing acts that
select compromise outcomes. Suppose that X = fa; b; cg and consider a preference prole (v; p)
such that v1(a) = v2(c) = 1; v1(b) = v2(b) = :99; v1(c) = v2(a) = 0; and p1(b) = p2(b) = :99.
By Proposition 1, the natural compromise b cannot be picked in any state of the world at this
prole. The only admissible form of compromise consists in allowing di¤erent agents to choose
the nal outcome in di¤erent states of the world. An obvious corollary is that no two-agent
misvaluation-proof rule is (ex-ante Pareto) e¢ cient.
Proposition 1 implies that, if a two-agent social choice rule ' is strategy-proof and ex-post
e¢ cient, the state space must be partitioned into an event where agent 1 dictates the outcome
and a complementary event where agent 2 does: there exists a function  : Vf1;2g  Pf1;2g ! 2

such that
'(v; p;!) =
(
(v1) if ! 2 (v; p);
(v2) if ! 2 {(v; p);
where {E denotes the complement of event E in 
: The function  is essentially unique: the event
(v; p) is uniquely dened at every prole (v; p) where (v1) 6= (v2); it is indeterminate if and
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only if (v1) = (v2): Proposition 1, however, is not a characterization result: it does not spell out
the restrictions that strategy-proofness implies on the function  associated with ': Our rst step
in that direction is recorded in Proposition 2 below. It asserts that the valuation prole cannot
be used to partition the state space: the chosen partition may only depend upon the belief prole
p.1 Call a function s : Pf1;2g ! 2
 an (
-) assignment rule.
Proposition 2. If a social choice rule ' 2 (f1; 2g) is strategy-proof and ex-post e¢ cient, then
there exists a unique 
-assignment rule s such that, for all (v; p) 2 Vf1;2g Pf1;2g and all ! 2 
;
'(v; p;!) =
(
(v1) if ! 2 s(p);
(v2) if ! 2 {s(p):
(1)
When (1) holds, we say that s is associated with, or generates, ': We are now left with the
task of identifying the restrictions that strategy-proofness of a social choice rule ' implies on
its associated assignment rule s: With a slight abuse of terminology, let us call s : Pf1;2g ! 2

strategy-proof if misrepresenting ones belief never allows one to obtain an event that one judges
more likely:
p1(s(p1; p2))  p1(s(p01; p2)) for all p1; p01; p2 2 P ;
p2({s(p1; p2))  p2({s(p1; p02)) for all p1; p2; p02 2 P.
If ' is strategy-proof, its associated assignment rule s must also be strategy-proof.2 Conversely,
if an 
-assignment rule s is strategy-proof, it is clear that the two-agent top-selection rule ' it
generates is strategy-proof.3
There are two basic types of strategy-proof 
-assignment rules. The rst type uses the beliefs
of (at most) one agent. That agent receives from an exogenous menu the event that she reports
to be the most likely; the complement of that event is then assigned to the other agent. Formally,
an 
-assignment rule s is dictatorial if there exists a nonempty collection E of non-nested events
such that s(p) maximizes p1 over E for all p 2 Pf1;2g (in which case agent 1 is called a dictator) or
{s(p) maximizes p2 over

{E : E 2 E	 for all p 2 Pf1;2g (in which case agent 2 is called a dictator).
The range of such an assignment rule is E ; its size may be as large as the maximal number of
1More precisely: the assignment (v; p) cannot vary with v at any prole (v; p) where (v1) 6= (v2): If (v1) =
(v2), the assignment (v; p) could be a¤ected by a change in v that leaves (v1); (v2) unchanged. But since
(v1) = (v2), this is immaterial:  can always be replaced with an assignment function that is constant in v and
generates the same social choice rule '.
2The problem of describing the strategy-proof assignment rules is mathematically equivalent to the problem of
describing the stratgy-proof procedures for allocating strictly desirable indivisible objects to agents with additive
preferences over sets of such objects. Some such procedures have been studied in the literature (see, e.g., Pápai
(2007)) but no general characterization is known.
3This converse statement does not extend to more than two agents.
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non-nested events.4 As usual, dictatorship is understood to hold on the range of the rule. If E
contains a single event, then s is constant and both agents are (trivial) dictators.
The second basic type of strategy-proof 
-assignment rule uses the beliefs of both agents.
Two non-nested events are exogenously selected from the state space. The rst event is assigned
to agent 1 and its complement is assigned to agent 2 unless agent 1 reports that she nds the
second event more likely than the rst and agent 2 reports the opposite belief. In that case the
second event is assigned to agent 1 and its complement is assigned to agent 2: We call such rules
consensual assignment rules. Formally, s is consensual (with default B) if there exist two non-
nested events A;B  
 such that for all (p1; p2) 2 Pf1;2g we have s(p1; p2) = A if p1(A) > p1(B)
and p2({A) > p2({B); and s(p1; p2) = B otherwise. The range of a consensual 
-assignment rule
is of size two.
Our next result is a complete characterization of the two-agent strategy-proof and ex-post
e¢ cient social choice rules for the particular case where the state space is of size two.
Proposition 3. Suppose 
 = f!1; !2g. A social choice rule ' 2 (f1; 2g) is strategy-proof
and ex-post e¢ cient if and only if there exists a dictatorial or consensual 
-assignment rule
s : Pf1;2g ! 2
 such that, for all (v; p) 2 Vf1;2g  Pf1;2g and all ! 2 
;
'(v; p;!) =
(
(v1) if ! 2 s(p);
(v2) if ! 2 {s(p):
The important point is that the mechanism designer is allowed to use the agentsbeliefs to
determine in which state their top outcome is selected. This leads to possible Pareto improvements
with respect to the less sophisticated rules where the states in which each agents top outcome
is selected are xed exogenously. For instance, consider the social choice rule 's generated by
the consensual assignment rule s(p1; p2) = f!2g if p1(!2) > p1(!1) and p2(!2) < p2(!1); and
s(p1; p2) = f!1g otherwise: an agents top outcome is selected in the event bearing her name
unless both agents prefer to swap their endowment events. This social choice rule Pareto-
dominates the rule '(v; p;!i) = t(vi) where an agents top outcome is always selected in the event
bearing her name.
Let us now return to state spaces of arbitrary size. Dictatorial 
-assignment rules are fairly
exible (in the sense that their range may be large) but they are exceedingly asymmetric. Con-
sensual rules are more symmetric (as they use both agentsbeliefs) but they are extremely rigid
(since their range contains only two events). When there are more than two states, these two
basic types of rules can be combined to produce more balanced procedures. For each event 
t in
an exogenously specied partition of 
, the mechanism designer may use a di¤erent dictatorial
or consensual 
t-assignment rule to assign the states belonging to that event. Because subjective
4By a theorem of Sperner (1928), this number is
 
K
bK=2c

:
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expected utility preferences are separable, the resulting social choice rule will be strategy-proof.
Formally, x a partition f
1; :::;
Tg of 
: For t = 1; :::; T; let Pt denote the set of injective
probability measures on 2
t : If p 2 Pf1;2g and i 2 f1; 2g ; dene pi;t 2 Pt by
pi;t(E) =
pi(E)
pi(
t)
for all E 2 2
t
and pt = (p1;t; p2;t) : this is the prole of conditional probability measures on 2
t generated by p:
An 
t-assignment rule is a function st : (Pt)f1;2g ! 2
t : Extending our earlier terminology, we call
st dictatorial if there exists a nonempty collection Et of non-nested subsets of 
t such that st(pt)
maximizes p1;t over Et for all pt 2 (Pt)f1;2g or {tst(pt) maximizes p2;t over

{tE : E 2 Et
	
for all
pt 2 (Pt)f1;2g (where {tE := 
t n E). We call st consensual (with default B) if there exist two
non-nested sets A;B  
t such that for all pt 2 (Pt)f1;2g we have st(pt) = A if p1;t(A) > p1;t(B)
and p2;t({tA) > p2;t({tB); and st(pt) = B otherwise.
Proposition 4. Let f
1; :::;
Tg be a partition of 
: For each t = 1; :::; T; let st : (Pt)f1;2g ! 2
t
be a dictatorial or consensual 
t-assignment rule. For all (v; p) 2 Vf1;2g  Pf1;2g and all ! 2 
;
let
'(v; p;!) =
(
(v1) if ! 2 [Tt=1st(pt);
(v2) otherwise:
The social choice rule ' 2 (f1; 2g) so dened is strategy-proof and ex-post e¢ cient.
The proof follows directly from Proposition 3 and the fact that subjective expected utility
preferences are additively separable; we therefore omit it.
To illustrate the richness of the class identied in Proposition 4 and the exibility of some of
the rules it contains, we describe two examples for the case of 4 states of the world. It will be
convenient to write pik instead of pi(!k) and '(v; p;!) = i instead of '(v; p;!) = (vi):
Example 1. The exogenous partition of the state space is f
1;
2g = ff!1; !2g ; f!3; !4gg : The

1-assignment rule s1 has agent 1 dictate over E1 = ff!1g ; f!2gg and the 
2-assignment rule s2
has agent 2 dictate over E2 = ff!3g ; f!4gg : The resulting social choice rule ' is shown in the
table below.
p11 > p12 p11 < p12
p23 < p24 (1; 2; 1; 2) (2; 1; 1; 2)
p23 > p24 (1; 2; 2; 1) (2; 1; 2; 1)
The rst cell means that ('(v; p;!1); '(v; p;!2); '(v; p;!3); '(v; p;!4)) = ((v1); (v2); (v1); (v2))
whenever p1(!1) > p1(!2) and p2(!3) < p2(!4):
Example 2. The exogenous partition of the state space is f
1;
2g = ff!1; !2g ; f!3; !4gg : The

1-assignment rule s1 is consensual with default f!1g ; the 
2-assignment rule s2 has agent 2
dictate over E2 = ff!3g ; f!4gg : The resulting social choice rule ' is shown below; its range is the
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same as in the previous example but the rule uses more information.
p11 > p12 p11 < p12
p21 < p22 and p23 < p24 (1; 2; 1; 2) (1; 2; 1; 2)
p21 < p22 and p23 > p24 (1; 2; 2; 1) (1; 2; 2; 1)
p21 > p22 and p23 < p24 (1; 2; 1; 2) (2; 1; 1; 2)
p21 > p22 and p23 > p24 (1; 2; 2; 1) (2; 1; 2; 1)
4 Concluding comments
Our results are obviously a very small step towards a complete characterization; we hope they will
stimulate more research on what appears to be a di¢ cult problem.
In the two-agent case, we conjecture that all ex-post e¢ cient strategy-proof rules are of the
type described in Proposition 4.
The n-agent case is wide open. We do not know whether Proposition 1 generalizes. An n-agent
ex-post e¢ cient and strategy-proof rule can be shown to be a top selection in the particular case
where it is restricted to use only the agentsbeliefs and their preference orderings over outcomes:
this is the analog of Gibbards (1977) assumption in the setting of lotteries. Rules of the variety
described in Proposition 4 can be dened; they are strategy-proof if, for each component of the
underlying partition of the state space, the corresponding assignment rule involves only two agents.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Fix a misvaluation-proof and ex-post e¢ cient rule ' 2 (f1; 2g) and a belief prole p = (p1; p2) 2
Pf1;2g: For any w 2 Vf1;2g and A  X; dene 
A(w) = f! 2 
 j '(w; p;!) 2 Ag : This is the set
of states for which the act chosen at the prole (w; p) picks an outcome in A: We write 
a(w);

ab(w); 
abc(w) instead of 
fag(w); 
fa;bg(w); 
fa;b;cg(w):
Lemma 1. Let a; b; c 2 X be three distinct outcomes.
(i) If (v1; v2); (w1; w2) 2 Vf1;2g are such that
1 = v1(a); 1 = v2(b) > v2(a) > v2(x) for all x 2 X n fa; bg ;
1 = w1(c); 1 = w2(b) > w2(c) > w2(x) for all x 2 X n fb; cg ;
then 
b(v1; v2) = 
b(w1; w2):
9
(ii) If (v1; v2); (w1; w2) 2 Vf1;2g are such that
1 = v2(a); 1 = v1(b) > v1(a) > v1(x) for all x 2 X n fa; bg ;
1 = w2(c); 1 = w1(b) > w1(c) > w1(x) for all x 2 X n fb; cg ;
then 
b(v1; v2) = 
b(w1; w2):
Proof. We only prove statement (i); up to a permutation of the agents, the proof of statement
(ii) is identical. Fix (v1; v2); (w1; w2) 2 Vf1;2g satisfying the premises of statement (i). If 0 <
"1; "2; 1; 2 < 1; construct (v
"1
1 ; v
"2
2 ); (w
1
1 ; w
2
2 ) 2 Vf1;2g such that
1 = v"11 (a) > 1  "1 = v"11 (c) > v"11 (x) > 0 = v"11 (b) for all x 2 X n fa; b; cg ;
1 = v"22 (b) > "2 = v
"2
2 (a) > v
"2
2 (x) for all x 2 X n fa; bg ;
1 = w11 (c) > 1  1 = w11 (a) > w11 (x) > 0 = w11 (b) for all x 2 X n fa; b; cg ;
1 = w22 (b) > 2 = w
2
2 (c) > w
2
2 (x) for all x 2 X n fb; cg :
Step 1. By ex-post e¢ ciency,

ab(v1; v2) = 
ab(v
"1
1 ; v
"2
2 ) = 
bc(w1; w2) = 
bc(w
1
1 ; w
2
2 ) = 
 (2)
and

abc(w
1
1 ; v
"2
2 ) = 
. (3)
for all "1; "2; 1; 2 2 (0; 1):
Step 2. By misvaluation-proofness and (2),

x(v1; v2) = 
x(v
"1
1 ; v
"2
2 ) for x = a; b and all "1; "2 2 (0; 1);

x(w1; w2) = 
x(w
1
1 ; w
2
2 ) for x = b; c and all 1; 2 2 (0; 1):
Step 3. Because 
 is nite and p1; p2 are injective, we have
min
E;E0
:
E 6=E0
jpi(E)  pi(E 0)j =: i > 0 for i = 1; 2: (4)
We claim that

b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ) = 
b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ) whenever 0 < 1 < 1; (5)
and

b(w
1
1 ; v
"2
2 ) = 
b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ) whenever 0 < "2 < 2: (6)
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Suppose not.
Case 1: Statement (5) is false.
Since p1 is injective, (i) there exists 1 2 (0; 1) such that p1(
b(w11 ; v22 )) > p1(
b(w11 ; v22 ))
or (ii) there exists 1 2 (0; 1) such that p1(
b(w11 ; v22 )) < p1(
b(w11 ; v22 )):
Suppose (i) holds. Fix agent 2s valuation at v22 : Let agent 1s true valuation be w
1
1 : Reporting
truthfully gives a utility not higher than 1   p1(
b(w11 ; v22 )) while reporting w11 yields at least
[1  p1(
b(w11 ; v22 ))] (1  1): The utility gain from misrepresenting is at least
[1  p1(
b(w11 ; v22 ))] (1  1) 

1  p1(
b(w11 ; v22 ))

=

p1(
b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ))  p1(
b(w11 ; v22 ))
  [1  p1(
b(w11 ; v22 ))] 1
 p1(
b(w11 ; v22 ))  p1(
b(w11 ; v22 ))  1
 1   1
> 0;
contradicting misvaluation-proofness.
If (ii) holds, a similar contradiction is obtained when agent 1 has valuation w11 and reports
w11 :
Case 2: Statement (6) is false.
Interchanging the roles of the agents and using the fact that p2 is injective, a completely
symmetric argument delivers again a contradiction to misvaluation-proofness.
Step 4. We claim that 
b(w11 ; v
2
2 ) = 
b(v1; v2):
Let agent 2s reported valuation be v22 ; this is xed throughout the proof of Step 4.
Suppose agent 1s true valuation is v"11 ; where 0 < "1 < 1: By (2) in Step 1,

ab(v
"1
1 ; v
2
2 ) = 

and by Step 2,

x(v
"1
1 ; v
2
2 ) = 
x(v1; v2) for x = a; b:
Truthfully reporting v"11 yields the utility p1(
a(v
"1
1 ; v
2
2 )) = p1(
a(v1; v2)): Reporting w
1
1 yields
p1(
a(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ))+ p1(
c(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ))(1  "1): Misvaluation-proofness thus requires p1(
a(v1; v2)) 
p1(
a(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ))+ p1(
c(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ))(1   "1): None of the three events in this inequality changes
with "1: Therefore, letting "1 ! 0 yields p1(
a(v1; v2))  p1(
ac(w11 ; v22 )): Since by Step 1

ab(v1; v2) = 
 = 
abc(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ), we get
p1(
b(v1; v2))  p1(
b(w11 ; v22 )): (7)
Next, suppose agent 1s true valuation is w11 : Truth-telling yields a utility of at most 1  
11
p1(
b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 )):Reporting v
"1
1 ; 0 < "1 < 1; gives (1 1)p1(
a(v"11 ; v22 )) = (1 1) [1  p1(
b(v"11 ; v22 ))] =
(1   1) [1  p1(
b(v1; v2))]. Misvaluation-proofness therefore requires 1   p1(
b(w11 ; v22 )) 
(1  1) [1  p1(
b(v1; v2))] ; that is,
p1(
b(v1; v2))  p1(
b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ))  1
1  1 > p1(
b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ))  1: (8)
Combining inequalities (7) and (8) gives
p1(
b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ))  1 < p1(
b(v1; v2))  p1(
b(w11 ; v22 )):
By denition of 1; this means that 
b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ) = 
b(v1; v2):
Step 5. We claim that 
b(w11 ; v
2
2 ) = 
b(w1; w2):
Let agent 1s reported valuation be xed at w11 :
Suppose agent 2s true valuation is w22 ; where 0 < 2 < 1: By Step 2,

x(w
1
1 ; w
2
2 ) = 
x(w1; w2) for x = b; c; (9)
hence by Step 1,

bc(w
1
1 ; w
2
2 ) = 
: (10)
Truthfully reportingw22 yields the utility p2(
b(w
1
1 ; w
2
2 )) + p2(
c(w
1
1 ; w
2
2 ))2 = p2(
b(w1; w2))
+ p2(
c(w1; w2))2 because of (9). Reporting v
2
2 yields at least p2(
b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ))+ p2(
c(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ))2:
Misvaluation-proofness thus requires p2(
b(w1; w2)) +p2( 
c(w1; w2))2  p2(
b(w11 ; v22 )) + p2(
c
(w11 ; v
2
2 ))2: None of the four events in this inequality changes with 2: Therefore, letting 2 ! 0
yields
p2(
b(w1; w2))  p2(
b(w11 ; v22 )): (11)
Next, suppose agent 2s true valuation is v22 : Truth-telling yields a utility of at most p2(
b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ))
+ [1  p2(
b(w11 ; v22 )]2. Reporting w22 gives at least p2(
b(w11 ; w22 )) = p2(
b(w1; w2)); where
the equality holds by Step 2. Misvaluation-proofness thus requires p2 (
b (w
1
1 ; v
2
2 )) + [1 
p2(
b (w
1
1 ; v
2
2 )]2  p2(
b(w1; w2)): Because none of the three events in this inequality varies
with "2; letting "2 ! 0 gives
p2(
b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ))  p2(
b(w1; w2)): (12)
Inequalities (11), (12) and the fact that p2 is injective give 
b(w
1
1 ; v
2
2 ) = 
b(w1; w2):
Steps 4 and 5 together establish that 
b(v1; v2) = 
b(w1; w2):
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Lemma 2. Let a; b; c 2 X be three distinct outcomes. If (v1; v2); (w1; w2) 2 Vf1;2g are such that
1 = w1(c); 1 = v1(a) > v1(c) > v1(x) for all x 2 X n fa; cg ;
1 = w2(c); 1 = v2(b) > v2(c) > v2(x) for all x 2 X n fb; cg ;
then 
c(v1; w2) \ 
c(w1; v2) = ?:
Proof. Let (v1; v2); (w1; w2) 2 Vf1;2g satisfy the assumptions of the lemma. Let (ev1; ev2) 2 Vf1;2g
be such that
1 = ev1(a) > ev1(b) > ev1(x) for all x 2 X n fa; bg ;
1 = ev2(b) > ev2(a) > ev2(x) for all x 2 X n fa; bg :
By statement (i) in Lemma 1, 
b(w1; v2) = 
b(ev1; ev2): Since by ex-post e¢ ciency 
bc(w1; v2) =

ab(ev1; ev2) = 
; it follows that

c(w1; v2) = 
a(ev1; ev2):
By statement (ii) in Lemma 1, 
a(v1; w2) = 
a(ev1; ev2): Since by ex-post e¢ ciency 
ac(v1; w2) =

ab(ev1; ev2) = 
; it follows that

c(v1; w2) = 
b(ev1; ev2);
and therefore 
c(v1; w2) \ 
c(w1; v2) = ?:
Proof of Proposition 1. For any v = (v1; v2) 2 Vf1;2g such that (v1) = (v2); ex-post e¢ ciency
directly implies that '(v; p;!) = (v1) = (v2) for all ! 2 
: From now on, x two arbitrary
distinct outcomes a; b; let V(a) = fv1 2 V j (v1) = ag and V(b) = fv2 2 V j (v2) = bg : We will
show that 
ab(v) = 
 for all v 2 V(a) V(b):
Fix c 2 X n fa; bg : Let V(acb)  V(a) be the set of all valuation functions v1 such that
1 = v1(a) > v1(c) > 1  1 > v1(x) > 0 = v1(b) for all x 2 X n fa; b; cg ; (13)
and let V(bca)  V(b) be the set of all valuation functions v2 such that
1 = v2(b) > v2(c) > 1  2 > v2(x) > 0 = v1(a) for all x 2 X n fa; b; cg : (14)
Step 1. We show that there exist 
a; 


b ; 


c  
 such that

x(v) = 


x for all v 2 V(acb) V(bca) and x = a; b; c: (15)
Suppose not. Without loss of generality, assume 
x(v1; v2) 6= 
x(v01; v2) for some v1; v01 2
13
V(acb); some v2 2 V(bca), and some x 2 fa; b; cg ; the other possible cases are similar. Because
v1 and v01 rank a; b; c in the same order and 
abc(v1; v2) = 
abc(v
0
1; v2) = 
 by ex-post e¢ ciency,
misvaluation-proofness implies that 
x(v1; v2) 6= 
x(v01; v2) for all x 2 fa; b; cg :
Let v1(c) = 1  1; v01(c) = 1  01; where by assumption 0 < 1; 01 < 1: Suppose, without loss
of generality, that p1(
b(v1; v2)) > p1(
b(v01; v2)) (the case p1(
b(v1; v2)) < p1(
b(v
0
1; v2) is treated
symmetrically). By denition of 1; p1(
b(v1; v2))   p1(
b(v01; v2))  1: Fix agent 2s valuation at
v2: If agent 1s valuation is v1; reporting truthfully gives a utility not higher than 1 p1(
b(v1; v2))
while reporting v01 yields at least [1  p1(
b(v01; v2))] (1 1): The utility gain from misrepresenting
is at least
[1  p1(
b(v01; v2))] (1  1)  [1  p1(
b(v1; v2))]
= [p1(
b(v1; v2))  p1(
b(v01; v2))]  [1  p1(
b(v01; v2))] 1
 p1(
b(v1; v2))  p1(
b(v01; v2))  1
 1   1
> 0;
contradicting misvaluation-proofness. This proves Step 1.
Step 2. By ex-post e¢ ciency, 
abc = 
: We show that 


ab = 
; that is, 
ab(v) = 
 for all
v 2 V(acb) V(bca).
Let v = (v1; v2) 2 V(acb)V(bca): Let v1(c) = 1 1 and v2(c) = 1 2; where by assumption
0 < 1 < 1 and 0 < 2 < 2:
Step 2.1. Let w1 2 V be such that 1 = w1(c) > w1(a) > w1(x) for all x 2 X n fa; cg : We claim
that

c(w1; v2) = 


ac: (16)
Fix agent 2s valuation at v2: For 0 < " < 1; let w"1 2 V be such that
1 = w"1(c) > 1  " = w"1(a) > w"1(x) > 0 = w"1(b) for all x 2 X n fa; b; cg :
By ex-post e¢ ciency, 
bc(w"1; v2) = 
bc(w1; v2) = 
 whenever 0 < " < 1: Using these equalities,
misvaluation-proofness directly implies that 
x(w"1; v2) = 
x(w1; v2) for x = b; c:
If agent 1s valuation isw"1; preventing her from reporting v1 requires p1(
c(w1; v2))  p1(
c(v1; v2))+
p1(
a(v1; v2))(1  ") = p1(
c) + p1(
a)(1  "): Letting "! 0 gives
p1(
c(w1; v2))  p1(
ac): (17)
If agent 1s valuation is v1; truth-telling yields a utility of p1(
a)+p1(


c)(1 1) while reporting
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w1 gives at least p1(
c(w1; v2))(1  1): Applying misvaluation-proofness and letting 1 ! 0 gives
p1(


ac)  p1(
c(w1; v2)): (18)
Since p1 is injective, (17) and (18) imply (16).
Step 2.2. Let w2 2 V be such that 1 = w2(c) > w2(b) > w2(x) for all x 2 X n fb; cg : We claim
that

c(v1; w2) = 


bc: (19)
Up to a permutation of players 1 and 2 and a permutation of outcomes a and b; the proof is
identical to that of (16) and therefore omitted.
Step 2.3. From (16) and (19) we obtain 
c  
ac \ 
bc = 
c(w1; v2) \ 
c(v1; w2): By Lemma 2,

c(w1; v2) \ 
c(v1; w2) = ?: Therefore 
c = ?; hence 
ab = 
:
Step 3. We show that 
ab(v) = 
 for all v 2 V(acb) V(b) and for all v 2 V(a) V(bca):
Let v = (v1; v2) 2 V(acb)  V(b); the case v 2 V(a)  V(bca) is similar. Let v1(c) = 1   1;
0 < 1 < 1. Let C denote the set of outcomes other than a and b which are ex-post e¢ cient at v:
If C = ?; ex-post e¢ ciency directly implies 
ab(v) = 
: Assume from now on that C 6= ?: Dene
max fv2(x) j x 2 Cg = 1  k and note that v2(a) < 1  k < 1:
For 0 < 2 < 2; let u
2
2 2 V be such that
1 = u22 (b) > u
2
2 (c)  u22 (x)  1  2 > 0 = u22 (a) for all x 2 C:
Since (v1; u
2
2 ) 2 V(acb)  V(bca); Steps 1 and 2 imply 
x(v1; u22 ) = 
x for x = a; b and

ab(v1; u
2
2 ) = 


ab = 
:
Fix agent 1s valuation at v1: If agent 2s valuation is u
2
2 ; truth-telling yields p2(


b) while
reporting v2 gives at least p2(
b(v1; v2))+ p2(
C(v1; v2))(1  2): Applying misvaluation-proofness
and letting 2 ! 0 gives
p2(


b)  p2(
b[C(v1; v2)): (20)
If agent 2s valuation is v2; preventing her from reporting u
2
2 ; 0 < 2 < 2; requires
p2(
b(v1; v2)) + p2(
C(v1; v2))(1  k) + [1  p2(
b[C(v1; v2))] v2(a) (21)
 p2(
b) + [1  p2(
b)] v2(a):
Because v2(a) < 1 k; (21) implies p2(
b[C(v1; v2))  p2(
b): Hence, from (20), p2(
b[C(v1; v2)) =
p2(


b): Since 1   k < 1; (21) then implies p2(
C(v1; v2)) = 0: Since p2 is injective we get

C(v1; v2) = ?; hence by ex-post e¢ ciency 
ab(v1; v2) = 
:
Step 4. We show that 
ab(v) = 
 for all v 2 V(a) V(b):
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Simply repeat the argument in Step 3 with the set V(a) V(b) instead of V(acb) V(b); the
set V(acb) V(b) instead of V(acb) V(bca); and the word Step 3instead of Step 2.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let ' 2 (f1; 2g) be a strategy-proof and ex-post e¢ cient rule and let  : Vf1;2g  Pf1;2g ! 2

be an assignment rule associated with ': We claim that  is generically constant in v in the sense
that
((vi; v i); p) = ((v0i; v i); p)
for all p 2 Pf1;2g; i 2 f1; 2g ; v i 2 V, and vi; v0i 2 V such that (vi) 6= (v i) and (v0i) 6= (v i):
Fix p 2 Pf1;2g and i 2 f1; 2g ; say i = 1: Fix v2 2 V and let v1; v01 2 V be such that
(v1) 6= (v2) and (v01) 6= (v2): Since p and v2 are xed throughout the proof, we drop them
from our notation. Thus we must prove that
(v1) = (v
0
1): (22)
Step 1. We prove that (22) holds if (v1) = (v01):
Let (v1) = (v01) = a and (v2) = b: By our normalization convention, v1(a) = v
0
1(a) = 1 >
v1(b); v
0
1(b):
To prevent agent 1 from reporting v01 when her true valuation is v1; we must have
p1((v1)) + [1  p1((v1))] v1(b)  p1((v01)) + [1  p1((v01))] v1(b)
or equivalently
[p1((v1))  p1((v01))]  [p1((v1))  p1((v01))] v1(b);
which implies
p1((v1))  p1((v01)):
By a symmetrical argument, preventing agent 1 from reporting v1 when her true valuation is
v01 requires the opposite weak inequality.
Hence p1((v1)) = p1((v01)) and (22) follows because p1 is injective.
Step 2. We prove that (22) holds if (v1) 6= (v01) and v1((v01)) and v01((v1)) are su¢ ciently
close to 1. More precisely, let a; a0; b be three distinct outcomes and recall the denition
1 := min
E;E02
:E 6=E0
jp1(E)  p1(E 0)j :
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Suppose (v1) = a; (v01) = a
0; (v2) = b: Let " be such that
0 < " < 1(1 max fv1(b); v01(b)g)
and suppose v1(a0) = v01(a) = 1  ": We claim that (v1) = (v01):
To see why, suppose p1((v01)) > p1((v1)): By denition of 1; there exists a number  such
that
p1((v
0
1))  p1((v1)) =  > 1 > 0:
By reporting v01 when her true valuation is v1; agent 1 gains
[p1((v
0
1))v1(a
0) + (1  p1((v01)))v1(b)]  [p1((v1)) + (1  p1((v1)))v1(b)]
= [p1((v
0
1))v1(a
0)  p1((v1))] + [p1((v1))  p1((v01))] v1(b)
= p1((v
0
1))(1  ")  p1((v1))  v1(b)
= (1  v1(b))  "p1((v01))
> 1(1  v1(b))  "
> 0;
violating strategy-proofness.
If p1((v01)) < p1((v1)); a symmetrical argument shows that agent 1 gains by reporting v1
when her true valuation is v01:
We conclude that p1((v1)) = p1((v01)) and (22) follows because p1 is injective.
Step 3. To complete the proof of (22) in full generality, construct w1; w01 2 V such that (w1) =
(v1); (w
0
1) = (v
0
1); and
w1((w
0
1)) = w
0
1((w1)) = 1  "
for some " such that 0 < " < 1(1 max fw1((v2)); w01((v2))g):
By Step 1, Step 2, and Step 1 again, (v1) = (w1) = (w01) = (v01): This proves that  is
generically constant in v:
The proof is now completed by appealing to Proposition 1. Every two-agent strategy-proof
and ex-post e¢ cient rule ' is a top selection and we may assume, without loss of generality,
that the assignment rule  associated with ' is constant in the reported valuations. Indeed, if
 depends upon the valuations when their tops coincide, it can be replaced with a (necessarily
unique) function s partitioning 
 on the basis of the reported belief prole only.
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5.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of the if statement. The proof of the if part of Proposition 3 does not require
the assumption that the state space is of size two. Let the 
-assignment rule s : Pf1;2g ! 2
 be
dictatorial or consensual and dene the social choice rule ' 2 (f1; 2g) by
'(v; p;!) =
(
(v1) if ! 2 s(p);
(v2) if ! 2 {s(p):
Step 1. We check that s is strategy-proof.
This is obvious if s is dictatorial. If s is consensual, there exist non-nested events A;B such
that
s(p) =
(
A if p1(A) > p1(B) and p2({A) > p2({B);
B otherwise.
Let us check that agent 1 cannot protably manipulate s at p by reporting p01: The proof is similar
for agent 2.
Note that the range of s is fA;Bg : If s(p) = A and s(p01; p2) = B; then p1(s(p)) = p1(A)
> p1(B) = p1(s(p
0
1; p2)):Suppose next that s(p) = B and s(p
0
1; p2) = A: The second equality
implies p2({A) > p2({B); and the rst then implies p1(A) < p1(B): It follows that p1(s(p)) =
p1(B) > p1(A) = p1(s(p
0
1; p2)):
Step 2. We check that ' is strategy-proof.
Let (v; p) 2 Vf1;2g Pf1;2g: We check that agent 1 cannot protably manipulate ' at (v; p) by
reporting (v01; p
0
1): The proof is similar for agent 2. Agent 1s expected utility from '(v; p) is
p1(s(p))v1((v1)) + [1  p1(s(p))] v1((v2)):
Her expected utility from '((v01; p
0
1); (v2; p2)) is
p1(s(p
0
1; p2))v1((v
0
1)) + [1  p1(s(p01; p2))] v1((v2))
 p1(s(p01; p2))v1((v1)) + [1  p1(s(p01; p2))] v1((v2))
 p1(s(p))v1((v1)) + [1  p1(s(p))] v1((v2));
where the second inequality holds because p1(s(p01; p2))  p1(s(p)) by strategy-proofness of s and
v1((v1)) = 1  v1((v2)):
Proof of the only ifstatement.
Let 
 = f!1; !2g and let ' 2 (f1; 2g) be a strategy-proof and ex-post e¢ cient social choice
rule. By Proposition 2, there exists an 
-assignment rule s such that, for all (v; p) 2 Vf1;2gPf1;2g
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and all ! 2 
;
'(v; p;!) =
(
(v1) if ! 2 s(p);
(v2) if ! 2 {s(p):
Because ' is strategy-proof, s must be strategy-proof.
Since s is strategy-proof, the events belonging to its range must be non-nested. Since 
 =
f!1; !2g ; it follows that jRsj = 1 or jRsj = 2: If jRsj = 1; then s is trivially dictatorial. If
jRsj = 2; then Rs = ff!1g ; f!2gg and we distinguish two cases.
Case 1: s is constant in p1 or p2:
Assume without loss of generality that s is constant in p2:We claim that agent 1 is a dictator.
Suppose not: there exists q 2 Pf1;2g such that, say, s(q) = f!1g and q1(!1) < q1(!2): Since s
is strategy-proof, s(p1; q2) = f!1g for all p1 2 P, that is, s(:; q2) is a constant function of p1 at
q2. Since by assumption s(p1; :) is a constant function of p2 at every p1; it follows that s(:; :) is
constant, contradicting the fact that Rs = ff!1g ; f!2gg.
Case 1: s is varies with p1 and p2:
Then we may assume without loss of generality that there exist p1; p01; p2; p
0
2 2 P such that
s(p) = f!1g and s(p01; p2) = s(p1; p02) = f!2g : (23)
Since s is strategy-proof, (23) implies that for all q1; q2 2 P ;
s(q1; p2) =
(
f!1g if q1(!1) > q1(!2);
f!2g if q1(!1) < q1(!2);
(24)
s(p1; q2) =
(
f!1g if q2(!1) < q2(!2);
f!2g if q2(!1) > q2(!2);
(25)
where we recall that the event assigned to agent 2 at (p1; q2) is 
ns(p1; q2). To complete the proof,
we now check that
s(q1; q2) =
(
f!1g if q1(!1) > q1(!2) and q2(!1) < q2(!2);
f!2g if q1(!1) < q1(!2) or q2(!1) > q2(!2):
If q1(!1) > q1(!2) and q2(!1) < q2(!2); then (24) and (25) imply s(q1; p2) = s(p1; q2) = f!1g :
Strategy-proofness then implies s(q1; q2) = f!1g : Indeed, if s(q1; q2) = f!2g ; then q1(s(p1; q2)) =
q1(!1) > q1(!2) = q1(s(q1; q2)) and agent 1 has an incentive to manipulate s at (q1; q2) (and agent
2 has a similar incentive).
Next, suppose that q1(!1) < q1(!2) or q2(!1) > q2(!2): Without loss of generality, assume the
rst inequality. From (24),
s(q1; p2) = f!2g : (26)
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Since from (23) s(p1; p2) = f!1g and s(p1; p02) = f!2g ; Strategy-proofness implies
p2(!1) < p2(!2):
It follows from this inequality and (26) that s(q1; q2) = f!2g : if s(q1; q2) = f!1g ; then p2(s(q1; q2)) =
p2(!1) < p2(!2) = p2(s(q1; p2)) and agent 2 has an incentive to manipulate s at (q1; p2) by reporting
q2:
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